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Abstract: Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual’s 
inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this paper 
I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of 
epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic 
improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically 
valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the foundations of a dilemma: either epistemic 
paternalism collapses into general paternalism, or a distinctive project of justified epistemic 
paternalism is implausible. 
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Introduction 
Roughly speaking, a paternalistic interference is one in which an individual’s choices or actions 
are interfered with for that individual’s own good.1 Part of determining whether a paternalistic 
interference is justified involves identifying what counts as a benefit to the individual interfered 
with. Whilst much of the literature on paternalism has focused on identifying the prudential pay-
offs of paternalistic interferences,2 a burgeoning discussion proposes that we could think about the 
benefit in epistemic terms.3 Epistemic paternalism is motivated by the thought that the individual 
is more likely to acquire, retain and make good use of true beliefs (according to the veritist),4 or 
increase understanding (according to the virtue epistemologist),5 should an interference take place. 
Discussions of justified epistemic paternalism thus equate the practice with the project of 
‘epistemic amelioration.’6 
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 In this paper I argue that in order to motivate this project the epistemic paternalist needs to 
explain why epistemic improvements are valuable (section 2). I propose that there are two options 
available to the epistemic paternalist: either the value of epistemic improvements is explained in 
terms of their contribution to wellbeing or it is explained in terms of epistemic value. I argue that 
the choice to be made between these options is the locus of a dilemma.  First, an appeal to the 
eudaimonic value of epistemic improvement renders the position of epistemic paternalism 
indistinct from general paternalism (section 3). The epistemic paternalist must thereby concede 
that paternalistic interferences that worsen an individual’s epistemic situation are sometimes 
justified. Second, an appeal to epistemic value makes it implausible that epistemic paternalism is 
ever justified (section 4).  Therefore, either there is no moral distinction between epistemic 
paternalism and paternalism in general, or if it is distinctive, a project of justified epistemic 
paternalism is intuitively implausible.7 The onus is on the epistemic paternalist to defend their 
counter-intuition. 
 
1. The Nature of Epistemic Paternalism 
According to a recent definition, a practice is epistemically paternalistic iff: 
 
1. It does not consult those interfered with on the issue of whether they should be 
interfered with in the relevant manner (the non-consultation condition) 
2. It interferes with the freedom of inquirers to conduct inquiry in whatever way they see 
fit (the interference condition)  
3. It interferes – exclusively or not – for the purpose of making those interfered with 
epistemically better off (the improvement condition).8 
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The first condition requires that the interference bypasses the agency of the individual interfered 
with. This is a condition that applies generally to paternalistic interferences; in order for an 
interference to count as paternalistic (as opposed to a consensual interaction) the interference must 
fail to consult the individual as to whether she wants to be interfered with in the relevant manner.9  
 The second defining condition of epistemic paternalism is that it interferes with the 
freedom of inquirers to conduct inquiry in whatever way they see fit.  There are a number of ways 
in which an individual’s inquiry can be paternalistically interfered with.10 First, information can 
be paternalistically disclosed to the individual. Health education measures could count as an 
example of this, should individuals prefer that information about the ways in which they are failing 
to live a healthy lifestyle are not disclosed to them.11 The practice of divulging unwanted 
information has also been discussed at length in terms of a patient’s ‘right not to know’ about her 
medical condition.12 Those who argue that such information should be mandatorily disclosed are 
defending a kind of epistemic paternalism.13  
Second, an individual’s inquiry can be paternalistically interfered with by withholding 
information from her.  Withholding information from a jury about the past crimes of a defendant, 
for instance, is thought to improve the jury’s ability to deliberate over the defendant’s innocence.14 
Other familiar cases of withholding information include the restriction of curricula in educational 
settings and the regulation of commercial advertising.15 These restrictions are partly rationalized 
on the basis that individuals will be in a better epistemic situation in the absence of false or 
confusing information.16  
Third, an individual’s inquiry can be interfered with through the use of deception, examples 
of which can also be taken from educational settings. For instance, a tutor might deceive her 
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students into believing that there will be a surprise exam at some point throughout their university 
course, in order to motivate them to revise more frequently (and thereby improve the course of 
their inquiry).17 The educational tool of ‘lying-to-children’ can also be viewed as a kind of 
deceptive interference with an individual’s inquiry. A ‘lie-to-children’ involves teaching false or 
incomplete theories to students in order to facilitate a better understanding of more complex 
theories. For instance, a student might first be taught that Newtonian mechanics provides a 
complete account of the laws of motion, in order to make it easier for them to learn quantum 
mechanics.18 
Fourth, an individual’s inquiry could also be interfered with through coercive measures. 
Whilst it is plausible to think that it is impossible to directly coerce beliefs,19 there are a number 
of indirect ways in which an individual’s beliefs or understanding can be coerced. One way would 
be through physically manipulating the brain and directly implanting beliefs into the individual. 
Another way of coercing a change in an individual’s inquiry would be via a physical threat. 
Imagine, for instance, that you hold a gun to my head and threaten to kill me unless I believe that 
the current prime minister is a clone. Whilst this is not enough for me to form the belief (despite 
my desperate claims otherwise), it is enough to make me behave in such a way as to acquire the 
belief; the threat might motivate me to read your literature on the matter, or even to take a pill 
guaranteed to induce the belief.20  
It is worth noting that each of these ways of interfering with an individual’s inquiry are 
available to the general paternalist. Indeed, some of the practices defended by ‘nudge’ paternalists 
involve reframing information in order to bring about (non-epistemic) welfare improvements in 
the individual.21 For instance, informing individuals that they are at an increased risk of developing 
skin or breast cancer if they fail to engage in self-examinations (as opposed to informing them of 
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the reduced risk should they carry out self-examinations) is thought to increase the chances that 
they will do so.22 Motivating individuals to carry out self-examinations in order to thereby reduce 
the risk of developing untreatable cancers can thus be facilitated by interfering with their inquiry.  
In the case of general paternalism the individual’s inquiry is interfered with in order to 
bring about some non-epistemic benefit (such as an improvement to her health). The distinctive 
feature of epistemic paternalism thus lies in condition three, according to which the purpose of an 
epistemically paternalistic interference is to make those interfered with epistemically better off. To 
date, the nature of an epistemic improvement has been drawn along veritist lines (an individual's 
epistemic situation is improved should she be more likely to acquire, retain and make good use of 
true beliefs)23 or in terms of fostering better understanding.24 I will not endorse either view here 
since the thrust of my argument does not depend on the account adopted.  
 
1.1 Types of Epistemic Paternalism  
Following the literature on general paternalism it is possible to make distinctions between types 
of epistemic paternalism.25 The first distinction can be made in terms of whose liberty is restricted. 
With direct epistemic paternalism the individual interfered with is identical to the individual that 
benefits. Epistemic paternalistic interferences that interfere with an individual in order to benefit 
some other person(s) are properly thought of as indirect.26 A clear example of direct epistemic 
paternalism is divulging unwanted medical information to a patient; it is the patient’s inquiry that 
is interfered with and the patient that is supposed to benefit. Deceiving an undergraduate student 
into believing there will be a surprise exam could count as a case of indirect epistemic paternalism 
if the interference is carried out for the epistemic benefits this will have on her peers: her 
contributions in class are better informed and she is able to help them with their assignments.    
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A second distinction between types of epistemic paternalism can be drawn in terms of how 
the interference is motivated. Mixed epistemic paternalistic interferences are motivated by 
additional non-epistemic reasons. An unmixed epistemic paternalistic interference is motivated 
only for the reason that the interference will make the individual epistemically better off.27 A good 
example of a mixed epistemic paternalistic interference is the case of withholding information 
from a jury. One reason this information is withheld is to bring about an epistemic improvement 
in each juror, but a further reason (and perhaps the main reason) is in order to facilitate justice – 
which is of benefit to society (including the jury).  Note however that this could equally be a case 
of unmixed epistemic paternalism should the epistemic paternalist only be interested in bringing 
about epistemic improvements in the jury.  
The final distinction rests on the competency of the individual interfered with. A soft 
epistemic paternalistic interference takes place with an individual who is judged as incapable of 
making decisions about their inquiry. A child’s education perhaps falls into this category. A hard 
epistemic paternalistic interference takes place with individuals who are judged to be worthy of 
having their decisions about their inquiry respected.  
The distinctions between direct/indirect, mixed/unmixed and soft/hard can be combined 
with each other in interesting ways. In the following my focus is on hard direct epistemic 
paternalism: specifically, on interferences with a competent individual’s inquiry for that 
individual’s own epistemic good. Whilst the examples used in the remainder of the paper could be 
interpreted in a number of ways, they should be read as examples of interferences with an 
individual for that individual’s own epistemic good.  
 
2. Epistemic Value 
Final Draft  7 
 
Paternalistically interfering with an individual on the basis that this will lead to an epistemic 
improvement in her is a controversial practice. For instance, some individuals would prefer not to 
be confronted with health warning messages on cigarette packaging if they want to be addicted to 
tobacco. Such an individual might want to have:  “…a classical ‘rockstar’ lifestyle, which implies 
to live in the present, to not care about the future, and to indulge in all the pleasures associated 
with this lifestyle.”28 Equally, patients don’t always want to be informed about their medical 
condition, claiming that divulging this information violates their autonomy.29  
In order to address such controversies the epistemic paternalist needs to both motivate and 
justify their position. To motivate the position the epistemic paternalist needs to provide an 
explanation of why epistemic improvements are valuable. To justify the position they need to 
explain when epistemic paternalistic interferences are justified. To date discussions have focused 
on when epistemic paternalism is justified, identifying the constraints that need to be in place in 
order for epistemic paternalism to be practiced.30 This discussion is only worthwhile, however, 
insofar as the project is properly motivated. This is because if one is unconvinced that we have 
reason to epistemically paternalistically interfere at all, then one will not care when epistemic 
paternalistic interferences are supposedly justified. 
The general paternalist motivates her position by arguing that paternalistic interferences 
are likely to bring about an improvement in wellbeing. Not much more is needed than this to 
motivate the position: wellbeing, flourishing or living a good life are all things that are intuitively 
valuable. (Indeed, the dispute between paternalists and anti-paternalists tends to focus on whether 
and the degree to which wellbeing value outweighs personal autonomy rather than on whether 
wellbeing is of any value at all). In order to motivate epistemic paternalism a similar move needs 
to be made. This will amount to appealing to the value of epistemic improvement. Unlike the 
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general paternalist, however, the epistemic paternalist needs to further explain what this value is, 
for whilst the value of wellbeing is intuitive it is fairly difficult to get a grip on what is meant by 
the value of epistemic improvement without further explanation. (For this reason, unlike with 
general paternalism, a very real objection to epistemic paternalism is that epistemic improvements 
are not valuable). 
There are two broad routes that the epistemic paternalist can take to explain the value of 
epistemic improvements. The first way identifies it with eudaimonic value, i.e. value vis-à-vis 
well-being.31 A second route is to identify it with epistemic value. On such accounts: “[t]he 
ignorant would always be ‘epistemically better off’ were they knowledgeable, even if not better 
off.”32 From here on I will refer to epistemic paternalism that adopts the former explanation as 
“Eudaimonic Epistemic Paternalism” and the latter as “Strict Epistemic Paternalism.”  
 
3. Eudaimonic Epistemic Paternalism 
The eudaimonic epistemic paternalist motivates her position by appealing to the value of 
wellbeing. There are two ways in which this can be further cashed out. First, epistemic 
improvements can be thought of as instrumentally valuable to wellbeing. On this account, 
epistemic goods are valuable because they make it more likely that the individual will be better off 
in terms of her wellbeing. Second, epistemic improvements can be construed as valuable because 
they are constitutive of wellbeing. On either theory, if we grant that the value of wellbeing is a 
good ground for justifying paternalism in general, then it looks as though we have grounds for 
motivating eudaimonic epistemic paternalism.  
Problematically, the eudaimonic epistemic paternalist’s neat answer to the motivation 
question comes at the cost of losing the position’s moral distinctiveness.  To bring this out it is 
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worth recalling the defining conditions of epistemic paternalism (Section 1). Recall first that 
general paternalistic interferences can meet both the non-consultation condition and the 
interference condition, since they can also involve interferences with an individual’s inquiry. I 
argued that the distinctiveness of epistemic paternalism is instead that the purpose of the 
interference is to make those interfered with epistemically better off (the improvement condition). 
However, if the value of an epistemic improvement lies in its contribution to wellbeing then these 
interferences fall under general paternalism: bringing about epistemic improvements is just one of 
the ways to achieve the general paternalist’s goal. Since the general paternalist can meet all three 
defining conditions of eudaimonic epistemic paternalism the two positions are indistinct.  
The epistemic paternalist might respond that what makes the project distinctive is that 
paternalistic interferences are only justified for the sake of bringing about epistemic improvements. 
This position, however, is absurd. To bring this out, consider other possible paternalisms making 
a similar claim. Examples could include, for instance, ‘dental health’ paternalism, ‘relationship’ 
paternalism or ‘good night’s sleep’ paternalism. These paternalisms are absurd insofar as they 
claim to be exclusive: i.e., that the only times we can paternalistically interfere are for the sake of 
improving dental health or fostering relationships or inducing sleep. The reason we value dental 
health, good relationships and a good night’s sleep is because of their contribution to wellbeing; 
to limit justified paternalistic interferences to any one of these goods is therefore arbitrary. The 
same holds for eudaimonic epistemic paternalism.33  
The collapse of epistemic paternalism into general paternalism has significant 
repercussions for the project of epistemic amelioration.  This is because what is epistemically good 
for us can come apart from what is eudaimonically good for us.34 In the following I present a 
number of cases in which the eudaimonic epistemic paternalist must concede that the individual 
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might be better off for being made epistemically worse off. This looks bad for the project of 
epistemic amelioration, since it suggests that we are potentially justified in manipulating and 
coercing individuals in order that they are made epistemically worse off. 
 
3.1 The War on Drugs 
One example of paternalism that purposefully aims to bring about an epistemic decline in the 
individual is illustrated by the 'war on drugs'. Government prohibitionists in the US have been 
known to 'routinely lie' and 'wilfully mislead' the public about the harms of drug consumption.35 
Wilful disinformation about the harms of drug consumption, such as the suggestion that marijuana 
creates 'crazed killers', and that crack cocaine is 'instantly addictive' has been criticized for the very 
reason that it makes the citizenry epistemically worse off, and is thereby inconsistent with 
‘enduring education.’36  
We can see, however, that the dissemination of disinformation about the harmful effects of 
drug consumption could be justified on paternalistic grounds under the eudaimonic account of 
epistemic value. Specifically, we might have good reason to suppose that bringing about an 
epistemic decline in the individual will improve their wellbeing: citizens are likely to be less 
tempted to try drugs if they falsely believe that they are extraordinarily harmful, and so more likely 
to lead a flourishing drug-free life. There is some reason to think that disinformation is unjustified 
in this case because it causes more harm than good.37 What is important to see is that if the practice 
did in fact improve the individual’s wellbeing, then the eudaimonic epistemic paternalist cannot 
claim that the policy is unjustified because it brings about an epistemic decline. 38  
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3.2 Health 
A second example of paternalism that depends upon bringing about an epistemic decline in the 
individual can be taken from the use of placebos in both medical research and therapeutic practice. 
A placebic treatment is one that relies on pretence in order to bring about a therapeutic 
improvement in the patient. This might involve, for instance, prescribing pharmacologically inert 
sugar capsules to a patient on the basis that they will alleviate the patient's symptoms.39 Other 
examples are the use of saline injections in order to produce an analgesic effect in the patient and 
the use of 'sham' surgeries.40  
Significantly, in order for placebic treatments to be effective, the patient must be deceived 
about the efficacy of the treatment being received.41 The deception is directly used in order to bring 
about a health improvement in the patient. The practice of deceiving patients through the 
administration of placebos could thus be justified should it bring about an improvement in the 
patient’s overall wellbeing.  The eudaimonic epistemic paternalist is unable to rule out the 
justifiability of such interferences on their own terms. 
Sometimes true beliefs can be all-things-considered bad for an individual’s health.42 
Informing a patient of the potential side effects of a prescribed drug can have a ‘nocebo’ effect, 
whereby the information itself produces the side effects independently of the pharmacological 
properties of the drug.43  In some contexts there is evidence that informed patients suffer more 
anxiety and pain and have more postsurgical complications than their uninformed counterparts.44 
Paternalistically withholding true information from patients could thus be better for them all-
things-considered because patients would suffer more pain with knowledge than without it. There 
is also some evidence that positive illusions about one’s medical condition can enhance health.45 
Not only might the eudaimonic epistemic paternalist be justified in paternalistically withholding 
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true information, but in some cases justified in fostering illusions or false information for the sake 
of bringing about an improvement in an individual’s health.46  
 
3.3 Cognitive Bias 
The literature on cognitive bias has been particularly influential for the project of motivating 
paternalism.47 Unsurprisingly, the problem of cognitive bias has also been used to motivate 
epistemic paternalism.48 Somewhat ironically for the eudaimonic epistemic paternalist, there is 
some reason to think that cognitive biases can be all-things-considered good for us.  Consider, for 
instance, self-enhancement bias in which one favours an overly positive conception of oneself. 
Whilst this is epistemically bad for us, it has been suggested that an overly positive self-evaluation 
can help avoid depression and promote high self-esteem.49 Inflated self-perception is also 
associated with increased chances of success and achievement.50 Rather than seeking to free 
individuals from their cognitive biases, the eudaimonic epistemic paternalist thus has reason to 
foster some cognitive biases, to discourage individuals from trying to overcome them or even to 
paternalistically lie to individuals about their existence. 
 
In sum, by motivating epistemic paternalism with an appeal to wellbeing, epistemic paternalism 
collapses into general paternalism. This means that the epistemic paternalist must concede that in 
some cases we are justified in paternalistically manipulating or coercing individuals so that they 
become epistemically worse off. Whilst the epistemic paternalist might stipulate that interferences 
that bring about an epistemic deterioration are unjustified they cannot do this in a non-arbitrary 
way.  
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4. Strict Epistemic Paternalism 
Strict epistemic paternalism saves the moral distinctiveness of epistemic paternalism by 
identifying the value of epistemic improvements independently of wellbeing. I will argue in the 
following, however, that it is unclear that epistemic value is weighty enough to meet the 
justificatory constraints on its implementation.  
 
4.1 Justification 
Two suggested conditions for justifying an epistemically paternalistic interference are as follows: 
 
a. Epistemic motivation: we have good reason to think that individual will be made 
epistemically better off51   
 
b. Balancing goods: we have no strong reason to suppose that the inquirer will be made all-
things-considered worse off.52  
 
The first constraint on justified epistemic paternalism is that we have good reason to believe that 
the interference will bring about an epistemic improvement in the individual interfered with. This 
means that interfering with an individual on the basis of a crazy or false belief that it will bring 
about an epistemic improvement is unjustified. Consider the following example: 
 
Malevolent force: I believe that a malevolent force is negating the information I divulge 
to other people. Consequently, I believe that if I tell you a truth: i.e. that smoking is bad 
for your health, then the malevolent force will make you believe a falsehood: that smoking 
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is not bad for your health. Correspondingly, I believe that if I tell you that smoking is not 
bad for your health, then the malevolent force will make you believe the truth that smoking 
is bad for your health. On the basis of this crazy belief, I tell you a falsehood because I 
think that this is the best means of bringing about an epistemic improvement in you.  
 
The above example is not a case of justified epistemic paternalism because I do not have any good 
reason for supposing that you will go through an epistemic improvement. The reason I have is a 
poor one because there is no malevolent force interfering with your inquiry and I have no good 
reason to think otherwise.  
The balancing goods condition is motivated by the thought that we might have very strong 
reasons against interfering even if the interference brings about an epistemic improvement. 
Ahlstrom-Vij expresses the worry as follows: 
 
…we can imagine a government with such complete control over government organs, news 
media outlets, educational institutions and so on that it is able to mandate the use of nothing 
but the most reliable scientific methods in virtually every domain of life, and remove from 
public consumption any misleading or biasing information. It might be that this would do 
epistemic wonders for the citizenry, and the government might to that extent be motivated 
to exercise the relevant form of control on epistemic grounds. But…of course…we might 
have independent reason – indeed, possibly very strong independent reason – to hesitate 
about a government exercising such great control, even given the prospects for significant 
epistemic benefits. That is, we might have non-epistemic reasons against having a 
government exercise epistemic paternalism on such a great scale.53  
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The thought here is that even if an interference is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement, 
we should not disregard the effect that this might have on the agent’s overall wellbeing, her moral 
responsibility, or indeed on matters of justice.54 One way in which non-epistemic harms can be 
taken into account is by balancing the epistemic benefits against them, hence the balancing goods 
condition (b). 
Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) criticizes the approach of 'balancing goods' on the basis that there are 
situations in which it is unclear how epistemic and non-epistemic factors can be weighed against 
one another, making it difficult to know when an epistemically paternalistic interference is 
justified. Ahlstrom-Vij thus drops the balancing goods requirement in favour of the alignment 
condition according to which the epistemic reasons we have for the interference need to be aligned 
with our non-epistemic reasons. In order to be aligned, our non-epistemic reasons must either be 
(a) additional reasons for interfering, or (b) neutral (which amounts to saying that we have no non-
epistemic reasons against interfering).55  
The alignment condition is, however, overly restrictive. This is because there are cases in 
which we can have a weak non-epistemic reason against interfering, but nonetheless think that the 
epistemic paternalistic interference is justified.  Take the following example:  
 
Daphne is considering motherhood. She knows that she may have a chance as high as one 
in four of having a child with Tay-Sachs disease. Her doctor has the results of her genetic 
test, which indicate that she does not carry the genetic trait, thereby ruling out the 
possibility that any of her children will be born with the disease. Since agreeing to carry 
out the test, Daphne has become pregnant and has decided that she no longer wants to know 
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whether she is at risk, preferring to adopt an attitude of responsibility to her child whatever 
the outcome. During the pregnancy, Daphne prepares for what she believes to be the 
possible outcome that her child will be born with the disease and her anxiety increases. In 
reality, she is worrying for no reason.56  
 
Given that informing Daphne that she does not carry the genetic trait would violate Daphne’s 
reproductive autonomy we have a non-epistemic reason not to interfere and so the alignment 
condition tells us that the revelation of this information would be unjustified. Intuitively, however, 
the epistemic and non-epistemic benefits of divulging this information to Daphne most likely 
outweigh the non-epistemic harms.  
Ahlstrom-Vij concedes that there may be situations in which an epistemically paternalistic 
interference fails to satisfy the alignment condition but would nevertheless be justified on 
balancing grounds. He argues, however, that these situations are not the norm.57The failure of 
alignment is, however, pervasive for direct epistemic paternalism; there will always be a non-
epistemic reason against interfering, namely, the harm it would cause to the individual’s personal 
sovereignty. This issue has been largely ignored because the permissibility of epistemic 
paternalism has been measured against the harm it would bring to the inquirer’s epistemic 
autonomy.58  According to accounts of epistemic autonomy, the epistemically autonomous 
individual relies on no one else for her knowledge and:  “…accepts only what she has found out 
for herself, relying only on her own cognitive faculties and investigative and inferential powers.”59 
The thought that epistemic autonomy is an ideal to strive towards is correctly criticized. For one 
thing, the ideal is not feasible.60  Second, the ideal is unattractive, and so it hard to see why it is 
valuable to be epistemically autonomous.61 Thus, the argument runs, since epistemic autonomy is 
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of no (or very little) value, it does not count against a justified epistemic paternalistic 
interference.62  
 The objection to epistemic autonomy is strong. However, the focus on epistemic autonomy 
has overlooked an important point: that the permissibility of epistemic paternalism still needs to 
be measured against our reasons for respecting personal sovereignty in the sense that the individual 
has a claim on whether or not she is interfered with. According to the anti-paternalist, an individual 
who can act autonomously and bears an autonomy right has personal sovereignty over: “…all those 
decisions that are ‘self-regarding,’ that is which primarily and directly affect only the interests of 
the decision maker.”63 They further claim that an individual’s personal sovereignty is of such value 
that we morally ought never disrespect or interfere with their autonomy out of concern for her 
wellbeing. This anti-paternalistic point can be straightforwardly expanded as a limit on concerns 
for her epistemic improvement, as it is with respect to interferences that are carried out for the sake 
of improving moral character or religious conviction.64  
One way of salvaging the alignment condition would be to deny that we have reason to 
respect personal sovereignty.  This, however, would be a radical view, comparable with an anti-
paternalist denying that there is any value to wellbeing. A more moderate response would be to 
claim that personal sovereignty is only pro tanto or prima facie valuable. However, if personal 
sovereignty is only pro tanto valuable, then in order to find out how far that value reaches in a 
particular case it will still need to be balanced against considerations of epistemic improvement. 
Likewise, to figure out whether or not personal sovereignty has actual value or merely the 
appearance of value in a particular context we would need to balance it against the other values 
we care about. The alignment condition therefore fails to give an account of when epistemically 
paternalistic interferences are justified because considerations of personal sovereignty will always 
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give us a potential reason against interfering. The epistemic paternalist should thus hold onto the 
balancing condition. 
 
4.2 The weight of epistemic value 
Unlike eudaimonic epistemic paternalism, strict epistemic paternalism is a morally distinctive 
project. So far I have argued that in order to be justified a strict epistemically paternalistic 
interference needs to meet the conditions of (a) epistemic motivation and (b) balancing goods. The 
question that remains is whether the justificatory conditions can be met, specifically: whether 
epistemic value can outweigh considerations of personal sovereignty.  
As noted above, epistemic paternalists have tried to justify their project by balancing 
epistemic improvements against the harms to epistemic autonomy. But now for the first time we 
can clearly compare autonomy proper with epistemic value, it’s intuitive that the project is 
unjustified. Suppose, for example, that I play a series of physics lectures to you whilst you are 
sleeping, with the intention that you subconsciously learn quantum mechanics. I have good reason 
to think this will be effective. You happen to have no interest in quantum mechanics and the facts 
that you learn have no bearing on your wellbeing.65 Is this interference justified on balance? The 
argument in favour is that your knowing more about quantum mechanics is of greater value than 
respect for your personal sovereignty. It seems intuitive, however, that the loss to personal 
sovereignty is in fact a weightier concern than the gain in knowledge: indeed, it looks as though 
you would be morally correct to admonish me for my secretive interferences even if you wanted 
to learn about quantum mechanics.  The strict epistemic paternalist needs to explain why this 
intuition is faulty.  
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Importantly, some forms of strict epistemic paternalism are less plausible than others. An 
‘extreme’ strict epistemic paternalist holds that the promotion of epistemic value is the only good 
that can out-balance personal sovereignty (considerations of wellbeing never provide justifying 
reasons for paternalistically interfering). In order to defend this extreme view the epistemic 
paternalist must show not only why the promotion of epistemic value sometimes outweighs 
considerations of personal sovereignty, but why it is the only consideration that can. In other 
words, an explanation is needed as to why the value of knowing quantum mechanics outweighs 
the need to respect your personal sovereignty, whilst considerations of your happiness do not.66  
A more moderate position holds that the balancing condition can be met with either the 
promotion of wellbeing or epistemic value. The moderate strict epistemic paternalist is thus also a 
general paternalist. Recall, however, that general paternalistic interferences permit bringing about 
an epistemic decline (section 3). In order to rule out such interferences, and thereby remain 
distinctive from general paternalism, the strict epistemic paternalist needs to provide not only an 
account of how epistemic value can trump personal sovereignty, but also how it counterbalances 
considerations of wellbeing when the two come into conflict. If it seems unlikely that epistemic 
value outweighs personal sovereignty, then it is even less likely that it also counterbalances 
considerations of wellbeing. Again, there is pressure on the epistemic paternalist to explain why 
this intuition is faulty. 
Perhaps a fairer interpretation of the moderate position is that we are only justified in 
paternalistically interfering with an individual when it promotes both epistemic value and 
wellbeing. In order to hold this position, however, an explanation needs to be given as to why 
either value taken alone is insufficient for justifying paternalistic interferences. One option is to 
provide an account of how wellbeing and epistemic value are necessarily tied together in 
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paternalistic justification, without reducing epistemic value to wellbeing value (as this would 
amount to eudaimonic epistemic paternalism). Note, however, that this would render any general 
paternalistic interferences that bring about an epistemic decline as unjustified. This defence of 
strict epistemic paternalism would have the radical consequence of eliminating the possibility of 
justified general paternalism, because wellbeing alone will be insufficient for justifying 
paternalistic interferences. The strict epistemic paternalist thus still needs to explain why epistemic 
value is weightier than the wellbeing concerns of the general paternalist. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that the epistemic paternalist is faced with a dilemma: either there is no 
moral distinction between epistemic paternalism and paternalism in general, or a distinctive project 
of justified epistemic paternalism is implausible. My argument hinged on the claim that the 
epistemic paternalist needs to provide an account of epistemic value in order to motivate their 
project. For this, they have two options: either the value of epistemic improvements are explained 
in terms of wellbeing (eudaimonic epistemic paternalism), or epistemic value is taken to be 
independently valuable (strict epistemic paternalism).  
 First, I argued that if the motivation for epistemic paternalism appeals to the value of 
wellbeing, the position collapses into general paternalism. Given this, the eudaimonic epistemic 
paternalist must concede that paternalistic interferences that worsen an individual’s epistemic 
situation are justified. This is because there are plausible cases in which an individual is better off 
(in terms of her wellbeing) for being epistemically worse off. I further argued that the eudaimonic 
epistemic paternalist cannot rule out interferences that bring about an epistemic worsening as 
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unjustified in a non-arbitrary way. A morally distinctive project of epistemic paternalism is thereby 
ruled out. 
Second, I argued that whilst the strict epistemic paternalist can avoid the collapse into 
general paternalism this comes at the cost of its plausibility. Against the most extreme form of 
strict epistemic paternalism I argued that it is implausible that epistemic value is the only thing 
that can outweigh personal sovereignty. I also suggested two more modest views. On the first, the 
strict epistemic paternalist holds that personal sovereignty can be outweighed by considerations of 
either epistemic value or wellbeing. Like eudaimonic epistemic paternalism, however, this position 
needs to address the possibility of general paternalistic interferences that bring about an epistemic 
decline. In order to hold on to epistemic paternalism as a morally distinctive project, an account 
needs to be provided as to why epistemic value can counterbalance considerations of wellbeing 
when the two come into conflict.  The second modest approach was that the only interferences that 
count as justified are those that are simultaneously epistemically and generally paternalistic. In 
order to defend this position, however, the strict epistemic paternalist needs to provide an account 
of why either value alone is insufficient for justifying paternalistic interferences. If successful, this 
would eliminate the possibility of justified general paternalism. 
The second horn of the dilemma is not a devastating objection to the project of epistemic 
amelioration, but it is important. What I have shown is that if the project of epistemic amelioration 
is to be convincing, then the strict epistemic paternalist needs to provide a detailed account of not 
only the nature of epistemic value but also of the justificatory weight it bears. If on the other hand 
the epistemic paternalist prefers to stick with the eudaimonic account of epistemic value then she 
will have to give up thinking that there is anything morally distinctive about her project. 
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